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This article is a somewhat abridged version of The Siebenthaler Lecture which Professor Allen delivered at the
Salmon P. Chase College of Law of North Kentucky University this year. The Siebenthaler Lectures are supported
by the Chase College Foundation. The complete text of
Professor Allen's speech appeared in the spring issue of the
Northern Kentucky Law Review.

T

he area of penal policy that I intend to discuss
is one demanding a certain amount of fortitude or,
more accurately, of foolhardiness to enter. It is a difficult and complex area, and one already much trodden
by some of the most distinguished personages in law
and philosophy. What I shall be discussing are penal
regulations of such things as the sale and consumption
of narcotic drugs and liquor, gambling, prostitution,
obscenity, and other forms of sexual expression. You
will notice that I am eschewing the phrase "victimless
crimes," which is the shorthand term most frequently
applied to these offenses. It has proved to be an unfortunate tem1 because it often diverts discussion in the
field from matters of substance to questions of label. At
times, it appears to beg the very questions that these
statutes engender and that are most in contention in the
community. Perhaps I can best describe my purposes
by saying that I intend to discuss a range of problems

arising out of sumptuary criminal regulations enacted,
in significant part, to vindicate certain moral attitudesattitudes that typically are in great contention and dispute within contemporary society.
My last comment suggests that it may be desirable
to say something about the relations of law and morals. I shall not say very much. Many intrepid souls
who ventured into that treacherous terrain have never
since been heard from. Let me suggest a dichotomy
which I shall submit not as a scientific classification
but as a device to focus attention. Moral concerns in
the criminal law may serve either as a sword or a
shield, and in many instances they may serve both
functions simultaneously. It appears dearer to me than
it apparently does to some positivist philosophers that
among the legislative purposes underlying the condemnation of certain homicides as murder is the
objective of vindicating a basic moral insight, namely
the value of human life. The lawmaker declares that
it is just and morally correct that persons committing
homicides and displaying the requisite conditions of
act and mind should be subjected to pains and penalties. This is not to deny that there may be other social
purposes sought when homicides are made criminal.
Reasonable security against homicidal threat is a basic
condition for the achievement of any sort of satisfactory social existence and the securing of the utilitarian
advantages of social life. But that the moral objective is
intertwined with such purposes seems to me clear,
and hence the moral concern serves as a sword: it
prompts the state to exercise its power and justifies its
exertion.
Yet, in the murder case the moral concern serves also
as a shield, and this function is not of lesser importance. When the prosecution is unable to establish
those conditions of mind and act that have been
legally stipulated and which supply the grounds for
moral condemnation of the murderer, the failure of
proof shields the accused from a murder conviction.
The concept of just punishment thus serves an important political function in that it not only releases state
power in the criminal system but also contains it.
Given the centripetal tendency in our times for authority to collect and burgeon at the centers of power, not
only in the socialist autocracies but in western societies as well, the containment of powers exercised by
systems of criminal justice becomes a matter of critical
concern.
Also to be mentioned is another characteristic of
what we often refer to as the common -law crimesthose that involve serious threats to life or limb or
unauthorized depredations of property. The moral concerns that unleash the sword of state power in these
areas express something approaching a consensus in
the community. For the most part the essential rightness of condemning murder, rape, larceny, and
robbery is conceded.
The characteristics of such common-law crimes are
in rather sharp contrast to those of the sumptuary
offenses I am discussing today. The laws defining
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sumptuary offenses, or many of them , disclose a
strong tendency on the part of their proponents to
employ morality as a sword and a corresponding lack
of concern or even hostility toward the uses of morality
as a shield. Nor is this surprising . One who proclaims
the virtue and necessity of intruding state power into
the private relations of persons may not be well
attuned to perceiving a morality that places restraints
on the wielding of state power.
It is quite true that public advocacy of sumptuary
regulation tends to rely heavily on utilitarian concerns
and assertions of social advantage, as well as on moral
principle . The public utterances of Anthony Comstock,
that nineteenth-century defender of American society
from the ravages of sin and art, illustrate the point. ·
The toll of vice, whether in the form of liquor, gam42

bling , or se ual irregularity, on family life, political
virtue , and (equally emphatically) on the economy ,
was portrayed in e crutiating detail and was , of
course , deplored. Perhaps it is not possible to disentangle utilitarian from moral considerations in
Comstock's statements and in the voluminous popular
literature of which they were a part. Nevertheless , it
may be meaningful to say that Comstock's moral concerns appeared to be greater than the sum of their
utilitarian parts .
There is a second point. The moral mandates
e pressed in much of the criminal legislation being
discussed , in contrast to those articulated in the common-law crimes, bespeak a morality that in greater
or lesser degrees is rejected and sometimes actively
opposed by large groups within the community. We
are dealing here with much less than a moral consensus , a fact of prime significance in a pluralistic society .
Opposition to sumptuary criminal regulation and
the attitudes that engender such opposition have
played a prominent role in American culture at least
since the 1920s. It is a position subscribed to by what
is probably a majority of college-educated persons in
the modem era, including those dedicated to liberal
politics and others whose orientations are primarily literary or aesthetic . The case in opposition takes a
variety of forms , but most frequently it advances the
values of individual privacy and volition .
Very likely the most important statement of modem
liberal opposition to extensive use of the criminal law
for the purposes of sumptuary regulation was that of
the Wolfenden Report , presented to Parliament by the
Scottish Home Office in 1957. The Report recommends, you will recall, that criminal penalties be
withheld from homosexual acts committed in private
by consenting adults and that sanctions for prostitution be confined to acts of public solicitation. These
specific recommendations have proved influential
throughout the English-speaking world, but of even
larger importance was the argument or theory that
underlay the proposals . The influence of the argument
does not lie in its originality, for, in fact , it derives
in principal part from John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty . Rather, the Report expresses ideas congenial to
the times and responsive, in the United States at least,
to widespread concerns relating to the position of the
individual confronted by increasingly intrusive and
encompassing state power. Thus, the Report asserts:
"We do not think that it is proper for the law to concern itself with what a man does in private unless it
can be shown to be so contrary to the public good that
the law ought to intervene in its function as guardian
of that public good .... As a general proposition it
will be universally accepted that the law is not concerned with private morals or with ethical standards."
And again, " .. . there must remain a realm of private
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude
terms, not the law's business."
So unquestioning are modem liberal attitudes
toward the concept of personal privacy that they are

often expressed in extreme and even bizarre forms.
Thus it seems sometimes to be assumed, on what evidence it would be hard to say, that the private lives
of political figures are simply irrelevant to their roles
as public servants, that a person may be a cad or
worse in his intimate relationships without any doubt
being cast on his eligibility or capacity for public service. Yet, the centrality of the value of personal
privacy, not only to thought about penal policy but
also, more importantly, to the strategy of freedom in
these times, can hardly be doubted. It is difficult to
conceive of a political philosophy that places great
value on individual autonomy that does not at the
same time posit a distinction between the private
world and the public world, the former substantially
immunized from the intrustions of state power. The
particular horror evoked by the society imagined in
George Orwell's 1984 (about which we are certain to
hear a great deal during the next two years) stems in
large part from its brutal and systematic destruction of
the private worlds of its members. The cogency of
Orwell's vision is revealed when attention is given to
portraits of the ideal citizen drawn in the official propaganda of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China. The "Soviet Man," for example, appears to
be one never in need of intervals of solitude, whose
motives are wholly and enthusiastically social, whose
unrelieved group existence proceeds under the benign
and penetrating gaze of his fellows and the Party.
Thus, whatever reservations one may have about the
ways in which the Wolfenden Report and others have
argued the case for the immunity of the private world
from state intrusions, the value of personal privacy
must continue to figure prominently in modem
thought about sumptuary criminal regulation. Yet
appeals to that value are not sufficient. Statements of
support for the immunity of the private world by
opponents of such regulation in the past did not prevent the enactment of some of the most oppressive
criminal prohibitions, and there seems little reason to
believe that they will prove sufficient against the
groups and forces organized today to advance the
enactment and to resist the repeal of legislation with
similar purposes. There are several reasons for this.
One is that the members of some of the groups simply
do not share the liberal's sense of the priority of personal privacy and volition, at least in the areas under
consideration. At best, these persons reveal attitudes
similar to those of former Congressman F. E. Hebert
who, in another context, is said to have remarked: "It's
not that I love the First Amendment less; it's that I
love my country more."
To characterize in this fashion all of those who have
supported certain criminal regulations of private
behavior, however, is to be seriously inaccurate and
unfair. Privacy is not the only value that must be pursued in modem society. It is not an absolute, and
competing values will claim their due. Much of the
controversy in this area arises from the incontrovertible fact that private behavior often has public

consequences. There seem to be no limits to the disagreements over whether such public consequences
are in fact produced by the private behavior, over the
seriousness of such consequences, and the importance
of avoiding them. Thus, if it could actually be demonstrated that the private perusal of pornography
transforms its readers into ravaging sexual beasts who
roam the community committing violent rape and
child molestation, it is likely that many persons,
including some who concede high importance to privacy, would favor the abridgement of such private
perusal in the interest of community security. So also,
the perceived social consequences of private sales and
consumption of narcotic drugs induce many persons,
rightly or wrongly, to favor prohibition of the sale and
use of heroin despite the serious and damaging invasion of personal privacy such prohibitions inevitably
entail.
The question appears to resolve itself into an issue
of how much presumptive weight is to be given to the
value of personal privacy in the numerous and highly
differing contexts in which the issue may arise. It may
well be, as I believe, that many modem proponents
of sumptuary legislation concede all too little weight to
the values of privacy and volition in the various contexts in which the issue emerges; but to make that
demonstration requires more than assertions about the
importance of privacy.
There is a related point. In the areas under consideration the value of privacy manifests itself in the form
of a political ideal, the ideal of the neutral state. The
state, in this view, must scrupulously abstain from
incursions into the private world. It may also be
required to act affirmatively to protect the privacy of
the private world from those who would disturb it.
The neutral state is thus the political paradigm for the
pluralistic society. Experience suggests, however, that
the state encounters formidable difficulties when it
attempts to assume a persuasive posture of neutrality.
In some areas, like those involving the establishment
of religion clause of the First Amendment, neutrality of
the state is constitutionally mandated: government
may not favor one religion over another, religion over
no religion, or no religion over religion. Nevertheless,
thousands and more likely millions of Americans see
judicial decisions banning Bible reading and prayers in
the public schools not as evidence of neutrality but
rather as active secular hostility to the essentials of
religion. These perceptions are likely to be especially
strong when the government abandons a previous
posture of support for religious practices or repeals a
criminal sanction against behavior still widely
regarded as immoral. Such moves are seen as active
governmental partisanship with the enemies of religion and morality. The sense of grievance engendered
by this perception is one of the most palpable social
facts facing one concerned with penal policy in these
fields.
It therefore appears that to describe the complexities
confronting penal policy in these areas requires resort
43
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to a wider range of materials than has ordinarily been
consulted, and that constructive thought about the
problems displayed entails more than exercises in
value analysis . One resource that ought not to be
neglected is the history of American experience with
sumptuary criminal legislation . Late in the nineteenth
century a prosecutor arose in a federal courtroom to
voice a remarkable proposition : "The United States,"
he said, " is one great society for the suppression of
vice." Most of us prefer to think of a great society as
an instrumentality for the advancement of human welfare, not as an engine for the forcible repression of
sexual derelictions and other sins of the flesh . Yet the
prosecutor's assertion contained a truth. Efforts to
extirpate immorality through social and legal coercion
constitute a persistent strand in American historyfrom the colonial period when the adulterer stood
44

before his neighbors in church dressed in a robe and
holding a lighted taper; to the activities of Anthony
Comstock's Society for the Suppression of Vice in
nineteenth-century New York , the Watch and War Society in Boston , the nationwide Anti-Saloon League; to
the modern groups who have declared their custodianship of American morality.
In reflecting on the relations of law and morals , a
reasonable a priori assumption may be that in comparatively simple, homogeneous communities, sharp lines
will not be drawn between legal prescriptions, on the
one hand , and moral and religious mandates , on the
other. The puritan communities in seventeenth-century
New England with their legal codes derived in substantial part from the Old Testament's Pentateuch may
illustrate this condition. Nor in such societies is the
imposition of criminal sanctions in the few cases that
arise likely to cause destructive tensions and disturbance, so long as the religious and moral consensus is
maintained at high levels. On the contrary, punishment of the occasional dissentient may strengthen and
reinvigorate the majority. It may remind them of who
they are and encourage rededication to their goals .
Such , however, is not the social context in which
most American experience with sumptuary criminal
regulation has occurred . For the most part criminal
sanctions have been resorted to during periods when
the older consensus has broken down and when the
proponents of repression are experiencing grave anxieties about the survival of the traditional moral codes .
Criminal enforcement of morals at such times displays
a critical loss of confidence in the efficacy of persuasion, education, and example to preserve the
traditional values. Often the ultimate resort to official
coercion follows a period of optimistic efforts to rehabilitate the erring elements of the community through
education and exhortation in an atmosphere of humanitarian uplift. The history may constitute a
corroboration of Lionel Trilling's well-known observation: "Some paradox of our nature leads us , when once
we have made our fellow men the object of our
enlightened interest, to go on to make them the objects
of our pity, our wisdom , ultimately our coercion."
The movement from exhortation to official force can
be observed most clearly in the emerging nineteenthcentury temperance movement, the aspect of American
experience with sumptuary regulation most fully
treated in the historical literature . The temperance
cause was in its origins an effort at persuasion and
conversion. In 1830 the American Temperance Society
pledged itself "never to make any appeal to legislators
or officers of the law, for the aid of authority in changing the habits of any class of their fellow citizens ."
This self-denying ordinance was soon abandoned by
many temperance leaders, however, and antebellum
debates on prohibition legislation reveal familiar disagreements over where the line separating the private
from the public worlds is to be drawn. There is a contemporary ring to Horace Greeley's prohibition
advocacy, written in 1845: "The fallacy here ... lies in

the assumption that the perpetrators 'injure nobody
but themselves .' They do injure others; they bring
scandal and reproach to their relatives; they are morally certain to prove unfaithful to their duties as
parents, children, etc., and they corrupt and demoralize those around them ."
Most of the successes the movement enjoyed in
securing prohibitory legislation in the states and cities
before the Civil War proved temporary . Obviously,
there were elements in the antebellum world strongly
resistant to the notion of coercive reform in these
areas . One source of resistance was a tradition of personal privacy and volition that prevented or obstructed
resort to state power. There was also a hard-headed
skepticism, lost in later years , about the feasibility of
such prohibitions . The crusty old Federalist, Fisher
Ames, observed early in the history of the Republic:
" If any man supposes that a mere law can tum the
taste of a people from ardent spirits to malt liquors , he
has a most romantic notion of legislative power."
Finally, many temperance reformers , convinced that
theirs were the dominant values of American society,
were able to maintain a faith that with energy and
patience countervailing values might be overcome
without resort to the public force .
By the 1860s the prohibition movement was in disarray . The successes of the pre-war years had largely
evaporated, and the prospects of future success were
dim . Yet in the course of the next two generations the
movement came to its extraordinary consummation
in the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment and
the passage by Congress of the Volstead Act. The reasons for this remarkable transformation of the
temperance movement from conversion to coercion
cannot be adequately considered here. Such an analysis would of necessity concern itself, in part, with the
burgeoning activities of that formidable engine, the
Anti-Saloon League . More fundamentally , attention
would need to be given to the sense of fragmentation
in American culture that pitted the " Protestant[s],
native-born, typically rural or small-town in their
origins" against the "liquor interests ," the immigrants,
and the very wealthy.
Whatever broad theories of social causation are
employed to explain the metamorphosis of the American temperance movement, there were certain
secondary causes and effects about which there can be
little doubt. The movement toward coercion was
accompanied by a new conception of those who were
to be the objects of reform, a progression from persons
requiring compassion and assistance to those seen as
adversaries and enemies. A process of dehumanization
occurred. In the Progressive Era reformers spoke much
about "the saloon" and " the brothel,'' and these
abstractions deflected attention from the concrete
human realities pervading the problems of alcoholism
and prostitution. An element of harshness entered
the reform movements and sometimes reached levels
of high in tensity . "The new Puritanism," wro e H . L.
Mencken, "is not ascetic but militant . Its aim is not

I

n the Progressive Era reformers
spoke much about "the saloon"
and "the brothel," and these
abstractions deflected attention from
the concrete human realities pervading
the problems of alcoholism and
prostitution.

The OVERSHADOWING CURSE
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to lift up saints, but to knock down sinners." As the
nineteenth century wore on something very like a war
psychology pervaded the temperance movement and
the anti-vice crusades . Nowhere is the tendency more
clearly revealed than in the career of Anthony Comstock . Two years before his death he could say with
literal accuracy: "In the forty-one years I have been
here I have convicted persons enough to fill a passenger train with sixty-one coaches, sixty coaches
containing sixty passengers and the sixty-first almost
full. I have destroyed 160 tons of obscene literature."
That it was a matter of regret to Comstock that the
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any of the prohibitionists
acceded to a program of
half hearted measures and thereby
created a situation in which law
enforcenzent was demoralized,
sanctions were applied capriciously
and hence unjustly, and in which
public life was corrupted and
hypocrisy rei ned.

sixty-first coach was not entirely filled cannot be
doubted. Reformers unable to question the virtue of
their causes become dangerous, for their convictions
strip them of capacity to perceive the moral characteristics of their own behavior.
Resort to the public force in these areas has produced other consequences that are clear and
demonstrable . One of these is a significant modifica-
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tion in the relations of individual right t
governmental authority in the Unit d States . For th
purposes at hand, the most important thing th t c n
be said about the Fourth Amendment i that until the
coming of national prohibition nothing e ist d in this
country that could be described a a corpus of constitutional law relating to search and seizur . Stat
prosecutors in the 1920s faced with enforcing local
legislation enacted to implement th Eighteenth
Amendment and suddenly confronted by the host of
privacy issues it spawned, sometime discovered to
their dismay that there was not a single judicial precedent in the state supreme court relating to such
matters. The e traordinary proliferation of search and
seizure law in the past si ty years provides the best
demonstration that sumptuary criminal regulation of
liquor use, drug use, and gambling, impinges heavily
on the privacy of individuals. Nor can there be any
doubt that the courts, seeking to accommodate such
legislative regulations to the constitutional immunities
of persons , have , particularly in the search, wiretap,
and undercover-agent cases, significantly constricted
the dimensions of the private world deemed immune
from state intervention .
Among the factors that frustrate the achievement of
coherent penal policy in the areas under consideration
is the symbolic significance that sumptuary criminal
regulation often possesses for the groups that sponsor
and defend it. At times the symbolic significance of
inserting or retaining such precepts in the criminal law
appears to be of greater importance to these groups
than the efficacy of regulation in eliminating the prohibited behavior. The nostalgia expressed by the
fundamentalist religious groups deeply involved today
in political activity looks back not only to an earlier
period when a higher morality prevailed but also to an
age in which groups like theirs were the dominant
norm-givers to American society. Such group , scorned
and lampooned in the last generation by H . L.
Mencken and Sinclair Lewis, today express the grievances associated with loss of status and power. To
understand the motivations behind the Arkansas law,
recently much in the news, that demands equal time
be given "creationism" whenever evolution is taught
in the public schools, one must take account of more
than the devastating impact of evolutionism on fundamentalist theology. The very existence of the Arkansas
law is a reassertion of political power by these groups
and symbolizes what to them may be the glittering
prospects of their regaining social dominance and
political hegemony.
The symbolic significance attached to sumptuary
criminal legislation by its supporters also goes part of
the way to explain another phenomenon that characterizes this history: namely, the willingness of the
proponents to sponsor or urge the retention of criminal
provisions that are patently unenforcible or unenforcible
without exorbitant costs that even the proponents
are unwilling to incur. The history of the prohibition
experiment, again, provides a useful illustration.

One salient fact about the American experience with
national prohibition was that at no time during its
fourteen-year life did Congress or the state legislatures
provide resources of money or personnel that even
approached the levels necessary for adequate law
enforcement. Shortly before the ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment, the Anti-Saloon League,
insisting that an overwhelming public demand existed
for the total elimination of alcohol from American society, blithely predicted that enforcement expenses in
any year would not exceed five million dollars . What is
more surprising, when events demonstrated that the
estimate was disastrously low, the prohibitionists were
remarkably moderate in their demands for greater
appropriations . The reason may very well be that the
proponents recognized not only that there would be
strong opposition to the increased taxation more adequate enforcement would entail but also that anything
approaching full enforcement would so impinge on the
lives of so many persons that the public might rise up
and demand an end to the entire effort . Accordingly ,
many of the prohibitionists acceded to a program of
half-hearted measures and thereby created a situation
in which law enforcement was demoralized, sanctions
were applied capriciously and hence unjustly, and in
which public life was corrupted and hypocrisy
reigned . Ironically, it was these conditions , along with
the impact of the great depression, that brought the
e periment to an end . It is surely worth a moment's
time to consider whether a somewhat similar history
might be anticipated should current proposal for the
recriminalization of abortion prevail.
There is probably no reason to doubt that the recriminalization of abortion would reduce the total
number of abortions now being performed in the
United States . It is also probably to be e pected that
the total number of abortions illegally performed
would reach levels substantially in e ces of tho e performed in the mid-1950s . This is true not onl because
of increased population but al o because there would
be a significantly large egment of the society unwilling to concede the legitimacy of the new criminal laws
and who would , indeed , conceive of them a basicall
repugnant to a fundamental human right. That ociety
would possess the will and resources ufficient to overcome this resistance in any complete wa i surel
problematic, and the con equences to the community
of such massive use of the public force for uch a
purpose could hardl be happ .
If, as seems more likel , a regime of partial enforcement permitting a significantly large number of illegal
abortions to be performed would ensue , the con equences, again, are not attractive . The effective
prohibitions of the laws would , in fact, be primaril
directed, not to the affluent and influential segments of
the community but to the poor and ignorant. Demoralization of law enforcement and losses in public
support for the institutions of criminal justice could be
anticipated . For those whose sole concern is a reduction in the total number of abortions, such factors will

' Qrhaps the most remarkably
:uccessful campaign of singleissue politics in American history was
conducted by that agency of
evangelical protestantism, the AntiSaloon League.
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not be seen as relevant . For the rest of the community,
however, they are entitled to careful consideration .
One final characteristic of sumptuary criminal regulation and the social dynamics that produce and
sustain it needs to be considered. The history we
have been reviewing makes clear that such penal legislation is often the product of groups practicing what
in the modem vernacular is called single-issue or limited-interest politics . The problems created for
representative government by uch politics are not
new , nor are they e elusively the product of groups
concerned with the enforcement of morals. In the ten th
of the Federalist papers, James Madison warned of the
dangers threatened by such groups , which he
described by the term " factions ." Toda observer of
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the national political scene describe the proliferation of
limited-interest associations , pursuing ever-smaller
loyalities, and producing what one writer has called
" the Balkanization of America ."
Perhaps the most remarkably successful campaign of
single-issue politics in American history was conducted by that agency of evangelical protestantism, the
Anti-Saloon League. Its record of achievement might
induce even members of the National Rifle Association
to doff their hats (or perhaps fire a salute) in its honor.
Founded in 1896, the Anti-Saloon League, within a
quarter of a century, was largely responsible for the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment and the
enactment of implementing legislation by Congress
and the states. Its interests were rigorously confined to
the prohibitionist cause; it sought no ancillary reform
objectives . It opposed or supported candidates for
public office solely on the criterion of the individual's
record of adherence to the dry cause . It displayed
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unremitting energy in furthering its program and
implacable hostility to its opponents .
What is most arresting about such groups , both
those that flourished in the nineteenth century and
those today, is their simplistic view of the social , and
sometimes the physical, world , and their inability to
concede any value whatever to countervailing views .
" An extremist group ," writes Edward A. Shills , " is an
alienated group . This means that it is fundamentally
hostile to the political order. It cannot share that sense
of affinity to persons or the attachment to the institutions which confine political conflicts to peaceful
solutions. Its hostility is incompatible with that freedom from intense emotion which pluralistic politics
needs for its prosperity ." Typically, and perhaps necessarily for their morale, members of these groups often
attribute wholly unrealistic importance to the problems
they attack and the solutions they demand. Thus , the
most famous evangelist of his day , Billy Sunday,
greeted the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment
as follows : "The reign of tears is over. The slums will
soon be only a memory . We will tum our prisons into
factories and our jails into storehouses and comcribs .
Men will walk upright now, women will smile, and
children will laugh . Hell will be forever rent ."
The precise dangers to the areas of public policy
threatened by the groups practicing limited-interest
politics need to be carefully defined . The danger, it
seems to me , is not that the fundamentalist groups will
regain social hegemony in American society . The
essential pluralism of our culture is deeply dyed , and
recent studies of the basic attitudes of the American
people in the last quarter of the twentieth century
reveal no disposition to embrace any single, authoritatively prescribed version of morals and mores . It has
been asserted that public-opinion polls sometimes
show a support going much beyond the membership
of the sponsoring groups for legislation mandating
equal time for " creation science" in biology classrooms . Such public response , if it exists, may be
indicative, however, of the very public attitudes that
in the long run will defeat the ultimate objectives of
the fundamentalist groups . The response of the larger
public may be an expression of the political instinct of
a pluralist society, however misapplied (as I believe
it to be) in the particular instance . It signifies a willingness to compromise an issue that might prove
unduly disturbing or divisive . The solution of " equal
time" for contending views is seen as an expression of
tolerance, of live-and-let-live . What is being revealed
is an unconcern for the truth of the fundamentalist
propositions, an agnosticism toward both religion and
science, a willingness to "split the difference" -in
short, a rejection of the very dogmatism that the fundamentalists seek to advance and impose .
This is not to suggest that the fundamentalist groups
are powerless to affect public policy and in some localities to dominate many aspects of life, including many
properly relegated to the private world. The situation
is the familiar one in which highly organized groups

whose members, afflicted by no doubts, confidently
advance panaceas for problems bewildering the larger
community, and thereby gain an influence wholly disproportionate to their numbers or the merits of their
proposals. This is a time in which many members
of the larger community are immobilized by the magnitude and intricacy of modem problems; many have
become disillusioned about their capacities to define or
achieve social purposes, and are apparently incapable
of organizing effective opposition to the practitioners
of limited-interest politics.
Accordingly, the limited-interest groups, even when
they are incapable of forcing affirmative changes in
public policy, may on occasion exercise a veto power.
A striking example occurred in the autumn of 1981
when the House of Representatives, for only the second time since home rule was established in the
District of Columbia, rejected a bill adopted by the
District City Council, and the disapproval carried by a
vote of more than two to one. The rejected bill would
have reduced or eliminated criminal penalties for sexual acts between consenting adults, and in its
essentials resembled provisions long since adopted by
many state legislatures across the country. It is hardly
credible that the action of the House signals any sudden and massive shift in the views of legislative
majorities on the merits of the issues posed. Quite
obviously many members joined the majority because
they feared to do otherwise. The values of local selfdetermination and of clarifying the boundaries of the
private world proved not as compelling as avoiding
the hostility of the private group sponsoring the
resolution.
Many of the most troubling activities of such groups
occur outside the legislative arena, such as causing
books to be removed from the shelves of school and
public libraries, complaints of which, according to one
measure, increased by a factor of ten in the last
decade. In the area of legislative policy, and most particularly of penal policy, the groups sometimes act to
eliminate options that good sense and sound policy
require be considered. In most of the areas in which
sumptuary criminal legislation has been enacted there
are gem,J.ine social pathologies requiring attention,
but the coercive reformers often obstruct the proper
identification of the problems and their amelioration.
Characteristically, the avid prohibitionist neglects education in temperance designed to moderate drinking
habits; those who most strongly champion enhanced
penalties for drug offenses ordinarily show least interest in the treatment of addiction or the stabilization
of narcotic intake at lower levels; the extreme law and
order advocate stands athwart efforts to formulate a
genuine correctional policy and expresses attitudes
little different from those manifested in the practices of
outlawry that prevailed in Anglo-Saxon England.
This, then, is the social and political world from
which the problems of sumptuary criminal regulation
arise. Are there any contributions to more decent and
efficacious law in these areas that can be made by
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law should be passed
mposing stigmatic penal
sanctions on persons that does not
clearly define the behavior that is
made criminal.

those concerned with penal policy as an area for disciplined thought and research? I doubt that at this point
we shall be tempted to exaggerate the magnitude of
the possible contribution. Here, as on so many other
occasions in the modem world, one recalls Cardinal
Newman's warnings about the fragility of human
knowledge and reason as instruments to contain the
passions and pride of men.
Yet, one ought not to despair too easily of the contribution that lawyers as lawyers can make. In the welter
of contentions concerning the relations of law and
morals in this field, voices should be raised in support
of the proposition that the law, too, has its morality
and that the claims of that morality should be heard.
No law should be passed imposing stigmatic penal
sanctions on persons that does not clearly define the
behavior that is made criminal. No such law should be
enacted before realistic appraisal is made of the
chances of its achieving its stated objectives; without
estimating the social costs incurred and the personal
values sacrificed in efforts to enforce it; without thinking about what is lost, not only if the enforcement
effort fails, but also if it succeeds. One need not be a
lawyer to raise such questions, but in many situations
if lawyers fail to speak, no one will. Moreover, the
lawyer's grasp of the institutional realities may often
enhance the value of his statement. In many situations,
of course, the statements will not be heard, or if heard,
will not be attended to. But this is often the fate of
reason in the modem world. Perhaps it has always
been so.

Illustrations courtesy of Michigan Historical Collections,
Bentley Historical Library, The University of Michigan.
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